indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other. And further, having given an account of the parliament, he says,-The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says sir Edward Coke, are so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons within any bounds. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority, in making, confirming, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal,this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can alter or new model the succession to the crown; it can alter the established religion of the land; it can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom,—and of parliaments themselves. It can, in short, do every thing which is not naturally impossible, and therefore some have not scrupled to call its powers by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament." Other writers have followed in the same opinion, Mr. Paley has embodied it into a universal principle, which he lays down in language the most decisive. "As a series of appeals must be finite, there necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which the constitution has provided no appeal, and which power for that reason may be termed absolute, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic,-and is alike in all countries"-the person or assembly in whom this power resides, is called the sovereign, or supreme power of the state; and since to the same power universally pertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called also the legislature of the state."-(Moral Phi. 2 part.-185.) Judge Blackstone and Mr. Paley, seem, in penning these passages, to have been influenced by the notion of a unity of the sovereign power, to which the expression supreme * 1 Comm. 46, +1 Comm. 60. power,' ," the general explanation of the term sovereignty, may have contributed; for it would be absurd to say there are two or more supreme powers in the state. They must of necessity be equal, or some must be subordinate, one only can be supreme that is, above all others. Mr. Christian's note on the passage from Blackstone is applicable to both. He observes, "The omnipotence of parliament, signifies nothing more than the supreme power of the state, or a power of action uncontrolled by any superior.-In this sense the king in the exercise of his prerogatives, and the house of lords in the interpretation of the laws, are omnipotent, that is, free from the control of any superior provided by the constitution.* Thus the parliament has the sole power in the kingdom of making and repealing laws; the house of lords, the sole ultimate power of interpreting them, and the king of sending ambassadors, of entering into treaties with foreign nations, and of making war and peace. There is provided by the constitution, no direct power of control over either, when acting within the constitutional limits assigned to each; but in the all absorbing sense of these writers, as they have expressed themselves, neither the parliament, the house of peers, nor the king, are possessed of sovereign power,-nor is it any where to be found, but in a state of absolute despotism, in which all the powers of government are concentrated in a sole organ, either a single person or an aristocratic body. And here it merits all the epithets so fondly lavished upon it, of absolute, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic. In every state, where any degree of liberty is enjoyed by the subjects, and their rights in any way respected, the powers of government are, in some good degree, separately delegated to distinct organs, and the functionaries are held accountable in some way for the due exercise of the powers with which they are entrusted. The powers of each must be competent to the purposes for which they are delegated; but no one possesses the sovereign power in that absolute and unlimited sense. It is in an aggregate, an abstract view, only, of all the powers of 1 Comm. 161, government that the sovereignty of such state is found,—such in fact is the constitution of the English government. All the functionaries in every department, are by the constitution placed in a state of accountability, even those over whom no direct control is provided, and whether the accountability be of a civil, or a moral nature, if indeed by the provisions of the conttitution it is equally a constitutional control. Let us for a moment, examine their constitution with that view. In the legislature, the members of the house of commons are accountable to the people through the medium of periodical elections. On the good opinion the people entertain of their public conduct, they are dependant for a continuance of their functions. As the house of commons constitutes a co-ordinate branch of the legislature, any control on that branch, operates an equal control on the whole legislative power, since no law can pass without their consent, and although the king is vested with the sole power of sending ambassadors, entering into treaties, and of making war and peace, yet he can neither support his ambassadors, maintain a war, nor carry into effect a treaty in which are any money stipulations on the part of the nation, without the concurrence of the legislature in raising and appropriating money for those purposes. This check is the more effectual, as every law for raising revenue must originate in the house of commons, who will not in that case admit even a proposal of amendment from the other house; so that in this respect the house of commons hold the purse-strings of the nation. The king's power therefore, in these, as in most instances of his prerogatives, without the aid of parliament, is but a nrveless power; and although the king is not personally accountable for the abuse of any of his constitutional powers, yet he cannot act without the advice of his ministers, who are required to sign their names to the advice they give; and if they advise measures that are unconstitutional, illegal, or pernicious to the public interest; the advisers are liable to severe penalties on impeachment. There is another check, arising from the nature of the constitution, and which is found in the public opinion of an enlightened community. This, although a moral control, acts on every department of the government, with a force, not unfrequently irresistible. It has obliged the legislature to repeal obnoxious, and to pass popular laws; it has compelled the king to abandon his favorite measures, to dismiss his favorite ministers, and sometimes to employ others to whom he entertained a strong personal dislike. All the causes decided by the house of lords in their judicial capacity, in which they are assisted by all the judges of the superior courts, are publicly discussed by the most able counsel, and in the presence of the first jurists who lead the opinion of the nation on such subjects; and the lords, ambitious of the honors of their station, well know that the respect which they claim for their rank, depends on the public opinion of their talents and integrity. If these checks are in some instances of the moral kind only, yet are they induced by the constitution of the government and the nature of its provisions. Nor is it any objection to the view, we have taken of the subject, that secret intrigues and corruption may sometimes render these checks ineffectual. We may then safely pronounce that this enormous, this omnipotent power of united sovereignty is not to be found in any single organ of that government, whether legislative, judicial, or executive. The government of the United States, as has been often observed, is wholly representative. By the constitution, the different powers are entrusted to different organs, and different functionaries, and are in each defined and limited with sufficient precision. Besides that the functionaries are accountable to the people at their periodical elections, the constitutionality of all legislative and executive acts may be called in question, and decided by a competent judiciary. All executive officers, even the president and judges, are liable to impeachment and removal, for malconduct in office. Neither have the people, the original source of all power, retained to themselves the sovereignty, absolute and unlimited. It is retained under certain modifications and restrictions, agreeable to the constitution which they have submitted to observe. In this constitution there is no where lodged that united sovereignty, that supreme power, absolute, uncontrollable, arbitrary, and despotic, which it is declared, must, in all governments, reside somewhere, and is alike in all countries. If such be the necessary definition, our constitution has no provision of internal sovereignty; and yet experience has evinced that the powers of this government, so limited and controlled, are fully competent to the great end of all civil institutions, the permanent happiness of the people, and the prosperity of the state. СНАРТER III. Of the political power-its depository and limitations in different governments. This subject has been incidentally anticipated in some degree in the preceeding chapters; but its importance as the primary and fundamental power in the state, in which originate all the civil powers, and by which alone those powers can be limited, controlled, and directed to their great end,-the security and happiness of the people, renders a further discussion necessary, in which I shall endeavor to be concise, and to avoid repetition, except where it may be necessary to a more full illustration. The political power is distinguished from the civil powers in the same manner as political rights are distinguished from the civil rights; and is exercised in forming, altering, or amending the civil compact or constitution of the state,-in which respect it is the power of political legislation; and in guarding the exercise of the civil powers, and holding the functionaries accountable in such way and manner as is provided in the constitution,-in which respect it is the guardian power of the state. But this power of political legislation has rarely |