governor, formed their senate or upper house of legislature. All other officers of the state generally, except town officers so called, captains and subalterns of the militia, who were elected by the people and sheriffs of counties, were, before the late revision of their constitution, appointed by the concurrent acts of the two houses of legislature, and except generals and field officers of the malitia, annually. Sheriffs were appointed by the governor and council, and removeable by them at their pleasure. The precedent, therefore, wholly fails. I readily agree that for the principle, where there is a probability that an equally good selection will be made for any office by the people, they ought to retain the election, although it might with equal safety be entrusted to some organ of the government. There will be many instances of this kind, besides those whose election has been mentioned in which the election will be better and with more propriety made by the people. Such will be the case with all the officers of a very numerous class of subordinate political institutions of which we shall briefly treat in the next chapter. We shall, therefore, consider here, of the appointment of those officers only who belong to the general government of the state. I fully agree that the general power of appointment to office ought not, as observed in a former chapter, to be entrusted to the legislature on account of the irresponsible nature of their situation, in that respect, and the tendency which it has to a corrupting influence. Some will think that the nomination or appointment to office is not in its nature strictly, either a legislative or an executive function; but it will be agreed that it better accords with the duties of the executive, than those of the legislature and will be more safely deposited with the head of that department on account of his prominent and single responsibility to the people. There are powers required for the performance of some duties which do not seem strictly to belong to either of the great departments of government, which yet do not require a distinct and separate department. These may be committed to some organ already established, with whose duties it will best comport, and where it will attach the greatest degree of responsibility, and, of consequence, the pow– ers will probably be exercised with a single view to the public good at any rate committing the power of appointment to the President does not violate a separation of the powers properly belonging to the several departments. The principal officers, for whose appointment a provision is to be made will belong either to the judiciary or the executive department. Of the propriety and expediency of the judges being appointed by the executive we have already treated. It will generally be found necessary for the more easy management, and for the sake of simplifying, to distribute the business of the executive into several subordinate departments, as the department of state, of the finances or treasury, and others as they may be found expedient; but for these it must be left to the discretion of the legislature to provide. The head of these departments ought to be confidential ministers of the President, and under his inspection. Subordinate to these in each department there will necessarily be employed. many officers, in whom great trust and confidence must be reposed; but how can the President have a full confidence in those, who are imposed upon him by others, or be in any degree responsible for their character, either for abilities or integrity? It is therefore proper, the President should have the nomination of these ministers and officers; and also, the power of removing them at his discretion as occasion may require. Indeed without this power of removal by the President, in cases of delinquency, great loss and injury would frequently be sustained by the public before a proper remedy could be applied. But as there ought to be every rational check upon the exercise of power, that may, without too much embarrassment, guard it against abuse. The President's nomination, as has been before observed, may with propriety be referred to the senate for their advice and approbation, without which the appointment cannot be made. This provision should, however, be with an exception of temporary appointments to supply vacancies on certain occasions, and of some other to be provided for by law. Although this advice is not of a legislative nature, it is apprehended not to interfere with any of the appropriate duties of that department, and to have no tendency to a corrupt influence on the members of the senate-and besides the general accountability of the President to the people, it will be an additional inducement to him to nominate to that body none but those, whose known integrity and talents qualify them for the office. The President may, with the best intentions, be sometimes deceived in his information, for which he must not unfrequently rely upon others. In such case, the senators coming from all the different parts of the state, some of them may know of objections to the person nominated and prevent an improper appointment. It will also be a proper provision of the constitution, that the legislature should have the power to vest certain appointments in the heads of departments, in the courts of law and on some occasions in the President alone. On a full consideration of this subject and the provisions of the constitution, that may bear upon it, we may fairly come to the conclusion that the President, who must feel a deep interest in the character of those to be appointed, and who must be supposed to know the nature of the duties to be required of each, and the abilities necessary to a proper performance of those duties, will be capable of making a better selection of suitable characters for the several offices, than can be made by the people at their elections; especially, as it is certain, a great majority of the electors must, in a great variety of instances, act under a total ignorance both of the duties to be performed and of the characters and abilities of the persons elected,—and that such officers will, in their responsibility to the President, under whose inspection they mostly act, feel a more immediate and powerful restraint upon their conduct than can be induced through popular elections. And when we consider that for misconduct in office, they are liable to removal by impeachment, to disqualification for future appointments, and are further subject to punishment at law according to the nature of their offence, and to a reparation in damages, the provision for securing their accountability is as ample as human institutions will admit. We cannot, therefore, hesitate to say, that under the restrictions proposed, the general appointing power will be the most safely and beneficially entrusted to the executive. We cannot forbear again to observe, that the mode of appointment to office here advocated, is not a departure from the principle of self-government considered as pertaining to a social being, the great end of which is the promotion of social no less than individual happiness. The maxim, however technical, will here strictly apply,-"Whatever a man does by another he does by himself." Where the principal is able to hold his agents sufficiently responsible for their fidelity and skill, his affairs may not unfrequently be better managed by them than by himself. This, with proper precaution will be found no less true of a people in their political situation, than of an individual in a private station. CHAPTER VII. Of Subordinate Political Institutions. In every state of any considerable extent, there will always be found many local concerns and interests, which, though not at variance with the general interest, of which indeed they form constituent parts, cannot be managed with propriety and to the general advantage by one central administration. For this reason among others, states have been divided into districts, severally organized with administrations adapted to the management of their local concerns, in due subordination to each other, and all to the general administration of the state. Such generally subsist in this country in the several states of the union, deriving their origin from similar institutions in England, the country of our own ancestors. In adapting them to general circumstances, they have received many alterrtions and improvements, on which it is unnecessary to dwell. The first grand division is generally in these states, into counties, which are again subdivided into towns, so denominated, especially in the Northern states. This division, also, comprehends cities, which are in fact only more populous towns, and the local interests of which become more intricate and important in proportion to their population and wealth, requiring a different organization and more extensive powers. One principal end in view in a division into counties, is the more convenient administration of justice. For this purpose the county is organized with a court, denominated the County Court, with a jurisdiction in causes civil and criminal, more or less extensive, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of the state. It is also generally provided that the trial in all causes pending before any superior court shall be had in their proper counties. By this institution, instead of a forced attendance of the parties at an extreme distance, as might frequently happen, and at an enormous expense, which can be sustained only by the most wealthy class, justice in civil causes is brought within the reach of all; and in criminal prosecutions it gives the prosecutor the advantage generally of having his witnesses to prove the charge, and the accused to prove his innocence, as we may say, on the spot. The powers of police, and the management of the local interests of the county, has been more frequently vested in the judges of the County Court, sometimes assisted by the sessions. In some states, the power has been vested in a board of supervisors, so called, the members of which are annually elected by the people of the several towns in the county. Their powers and duties are determined and regulated by a general law. They sometimes exercise a legislative power, as in the imposing of taxes on the inhabitants to defray the expenses incident to the county. They have also the direction and regulation of public or county roads. They sometimes act more in a judicial capacity, as in determining the proportion which each shall contribute, and in what manner, where the law has imposed a common duty or burden on two or more towns. Such county institutions best accord with the nature of our free governments. The next subordinate division is that of towns. Towns in these states have been so called from an analogy which they bear to towns corporate in England, of a lower grade than cities and of a different organization. In this country, especially in the Northern states, the towns are, for the most part, incorporated by a general law. In each state, therefore, the organization is uniform, and the powers and privileges the same. The organization of these corporations, their powers, and the exercise of those powers ought to bear an analogy to the general government of the state as far as their subordinate situation and the end of their institution will permit; and to attain that end they |