al capitals must ordinarily arise from the profits made by each in the management of his stock and the application of industry, and that from the nature of the thing each employer of stock must be the best,-and ought to be the only,-judge in what branch of industry, what branch of arts, manufactures, or commerce he can employ his stock most for his advantage,most to his own profit. A very slight consideration will, however, evince that the answer is, indeed, specious, and nothing more. It does not follow that because an individual capitalist is the best judge in what mode, or in what branch of industry he may employ his capital to his own private advantage, he is, therefore, the best judge of what-in a situation supposed to be practicable-would be most advantageous to the community. A situation may be produced in which capital employed in establishing some needful branch of manufactures now neglected, may yield to the employer a profit equal to that expected in the established branches. Nor does it follow that every employment of capital, profitable to the employer, is equally advantageous to the public; were it so, the greater the profit to the individual, the greater must be the advantage to the public, and the monopolist would become the great benefactor of his country; and the more enormous his profits, the greater the benefaction. If we suppose two persons employing equal capitals, and with equal profits, the one in the importation of foreign manufactures for the consumption of his country, the other in the domestic manufacture of articles needed in the country, and to be there consumed; the former, by the manner in which he employs his capital enables a foreign manufacturer to put in motion and reward a certain quantity of foreign industry. The other employs his capital at home-employs and rewards we will suppose-the same quantity of domestic industry, and increases domestic circulation, by whatever he disburses; while the other is added to foreign capital, and goes into foreign circulation. And if we suppose the articles imported from abroad by the one, and the articles manufactured by the other, equally necessary for the consumption of the country, there can be no doubt that the capital employed in the domestic manufacture is employed with most advantage and affords more accommodation to the community at large. And this is the more apparent when we find the raw material of the manufacture indigenous, and the means of subsistance abundant. Besides every commercial and manufacturing nation make regulations to favor their own manufactures and productions of every kind; and for that purpose frequently lay heavy duties, not only on the articles of manufacture imported from abroad, but upon every article of subsistence, and materials which are found, or can be produced among themselves, and sometimes amounting to a prohibition. These duties extend to almost every article of remittance, and are paid by that nation who are supplied with their manufactures. This evil can generally be corrected, only by retalliating duties on the part of the nation thus supplied, and which is, in fact, made tributary to the supplying nation. But in discriminating duties, it will be necessary to act with prudence and a great degree of caution,-whether the increase of duties be intended for the regulation of foreign or of internal commerce,-for the encouragement of domestic manufactures,-lest it should effect too suddenly a diminution of profits in any particular branch already established, to the great injury, or perhaps ruin of those who are employed in it. The limits prescribed in this work will not permit us here to enter into a more particular detail upon this subject which constitutes a very extensive branch of political economy, and has been discussed at large, by writers of the first talents whose works are in the hands, or at the command of all those who may be desirous of further and more particular information. BOOK VII. OF THE GOVERNMEMT OF THE UNITED STATES. CHAPTER I. Political Situation of the Colonies,-afterwards Independent States-previous to the Establishment of the present Constitution of the United States. The government of the United States exhibits a new scene, and may truly be said to commence a new era in the political history of the world, when a number of integral republics, each, then sovereign and independent, undertook to establish over the whole, a general government with full powers of legislation for all national purposes, and of executing its laws on the citizens, independent of the local authorities. The experiment was new, and the event has been watched with anxiety by the friends and the enemies of free institutions. A system so complicated, so different from that of a simple, or single government, of which we have been treating, must have an effect in the application of the laws of nature, from which the general principles are derived to give a different modification to those principles, owing to the different combination, and relative circumstances of the constituent parts, and to have an influence on the organization of the general government, and the adjustment of the powers of all and each, to the relations it is intended they should sustain with each other. The several American states, while they remained colonies, or provinces of the British empire, had no political connexion, national. or governmental dependence on each other. They were, though situated in the same vicinity, and professing allegiance to the same sovereign, united only through the government of Great Britain, the common head. There existed a similarity of manners, which might with propriety be denominated There were, indeed, provincial differences, but not greater than are to be found within the limits of England. As Americans they had little national sentiment. It was by different channels centered in Great Britain, or rather in England, the mother country. Any collected and permanent national sentiment among themselves, was opposed by that connexion. It was the policy of the British government to foment divisions among them to a certain degree, and to cherish their local prejudices. The similarity of their circumstances, however, and the difficulties of making settlements in a wild, uncultivated country, at a great distance from any part of the civilized world, introduced some degree of direct attachment. This attachment was increased and cemented in a considerable degree by the necessity of defence against a common enemy. Bloody wars waged against them by the savages instigated and aided by the French, the ancient enemies of the English, suggested the expediency and necessity of common counsels and united exertions. Consultations were held by delegates from the several colonies, measures for the common defence were devised, and afterwards executed, in pursuance of their common counsels. This was the germ of that general union of counsels and sentiments, which produced the American revolution. For a time, it acquired its utmost force from the oppressive measures of the British government, which equally effected the liberties. of all the colonies,-now the United States of America. The first inhabitants had brought with them all the liberal principles of the British government, and had communicated them nearly free and unmixed to the great body of their descendents. Their love of liberty had been cherished and heightened by an equal enjoyment of rights and property, under equitable laws, mostly formed by themselves; and they had been stimulated to a thorough investigation of their lights to which the extraordinary claims of power on the part of Great Britain had given rise. The principles of monarchy and aristocracy, had, however, prevailed, more or less, among some classes, in most of the colonial governments. They were, in form, epitomies of the British government. In each there was a governor, who represented the king, a council representing the house of lords, and an assembly of the people, the commons of America. In most of the colonies, the governor and council were mere creatures of the crown. They were wholly dependent on the king. He appointed them as well as the judges at pleasure. This created an aristocratical influence, hostile, in a degree, to the liberties and interests of the people. Happily, the plan of establishing a hereditary nobility in America was never adopted. Had such establishment been introduced at an early period, it is not an easy matter to determine, what obstacles it might have interposed in the great struggle for liberty and independence, by securing a deeper and more permanent interest in the aristocratical principles of the British constitution. When the measures which gave rise to the American revolution were adopted by the government of Britian, the great body of the people had not been corrupted by those principles. The sentiments of attachment, which originated in their descent from a common stock, had been cherished by a similarity of circumstances and adventures, and strengthened by their common counsels and united exertions, in a long and bloody war. These common exertions had confirmed an opinion of their united importance. A more general acquaintance had been introduced, and a reciprocation of counsels and good offices had tended to soften and remove local prejudices. A similarity of situation and similarity of danger, from the same quarter, united their sentiments and interests, and forcibly suggested the plan of again uniting their counsels to obtain redress. This produced the first congress. A number of delegates from the several colonies assembled for mutual counsel, on the common situation, in which they were placed by the measures of the British parliament, from which as the opening source, we may trace, through all the succeeding political revolutions and changes, the rise and final establishment of our present national government. A second congress was assembled, when |