tion, sanction a dangerous abuse of power, or an oppressive act of the government; but this is not to be presumed; especially, when we consider the manner of their selection and appointment, and the independent situation in which they are placed. I will finish this chapter by observing that the doctrine which I have here advocated of the power and right of final decision vested by the constitution in the judicial department, has been supported by the first characters in and out of the government, as well as by the great body of the people, who rest upon it as the great safe-guard of their constitutional rights and security against any oppressive acts of the government. Such opinion of the office and duty of the judges, has been maintained from the commencement of our republican institutions, not in theory merely, but in practice; not only in the general government, but in every state government in the union, all formed on the same republican principles. It is true that a different opinion has been expressed by individuals, and in some instances, by public bodies, during the excess of public excitement, but it has on the subsidence of that excitement, generally been abandoned as untenable, with some few exceptions. CHAPTER VIII. Observations on the tendency in government to dissolution, from a corruption of its principles.-Plan of reformation incorporated in the constitution.— Its probable effects in perpetuating its duration. Montesquieu, speaking of that kind of government, which was established through Europe by the conquerors of the Roman Empire, says "It was a good government that had in itself a capacity of growing better." This capacity of growing better was not the effect of any direct intention of the founders, nor, if perceived, was its cultivation, generally, an object of pursuit. Accordingly, we have seen this kind of government almost universally, degenerating into a species of despotism, under an absolute monarchy, or an aristocracy equally absolute. If any of those governments have admitted improvements, these improvements never have been deliberately made, in consequence of any plan of reformation adopted in the constitution. They have been constantly introduced by violence, or, in a concurrence of circumstances, little, if at all intended or foreseen. Notwithstanding the foregoing observation of Montesquieu, he appears to join in the opinion, which has very generally prevailed, that governments, like men, carry in themselves from their very origin, the seeds of dissolution; that man is fatally incapable of forming any which shall endure without degenerating. I am, however, apprehensive, that on enquiry, we may, so far as it relates to government, find reason to doubt the correctness of this opinion. A more general development of the laws of social nature, and the principles resulting from those laws, may discover, that although in the infancy of mankind, from which, perhaps, those nations who have made the greatest advances, have hardly emerged, this may be true, yet man is by nature, capable of improvements, which may render an amelioration in the science of government, as easy and familiar as in any other science. The same fate has attended all sciences of more difficult investigation. Their establishment and improvement have generally, been attempted by reasonings apriori, in which imagination is the principal agent. It has fared in the same manner with the various systems of natural philosophy, morality, and theology which have succeeded each other in the world. Within the last two centuries, experimental reasonings have banished innumerable absurdities, and in many sciences, seem to have laid a foundation of knowledge as fixed and as durable as the course of nature. It is at length perceived that all nature is subjected to certain laws established by deity in the original constitution of things, and that while some of those laws extend to inert matter only, to physical operations and effects, others extend to social beings, moral agents, to regulate and direct their actions, and that nothing can be durable, that is calculated to thwart those laws, or divert them from their course; but with this difference in the character of those laws; the laws of inert matter are, to the material agents irresistible, not so the laws of moral action. The laws of moral action respect the design of the agent; the laws of inert matter, have no respect to the design of the material agents; the former are obligatory and precede the action; the other necessary and accompany the operation. A knowledge of one class of these laws is denominated physical science; a knowledge of the other, with their proper application and direction is denominated moral science, and such is political science, or the science of government. That science consists in a knowledge of the laws of moral action, the laws of social nature, their application and their effect on the actions of men under government and laws, and their direction for attaining the great end of all moral laws, the happiness of social beings. For this, by the same laws, is left to the wisdom of man. The science of government is not merely theoretical, but a practical science. It requires not only a knowledge of the laws of nature, but of the subject on which they are brought to operate; the nature of man in soci ety, and the nature of the society, which is the subject of the government. The state of society is rarely stationary for any length of time. Under an absolute government, where the people are slaves, society is generally in a retrograde course until it has reached the lowest point of degradation, in which it may remain stationary as long as the government shall continue. Under free institutions of government, the state of society will always be progressive-there will be a constant improvement in manners and in knowledge. Such improvements in a community will, from time to time, require corresponding improvements in their civil institutions, to adapt them to the existing state of things; besides, in the best institutions that can be formed by fallible man, imperfections will be admitted, for the correction of which provision ought to be made in the constitution. No such provision was made in the institution of those governments, mentioned by Montesquieu. Each government, however, or rather the rulers who assumed the government, had a power to alter the constitution; but as they were not holden accountable or sufficiently accountable to the people, and therefore not in a situation to be restrained by any efficient fundamental laws, such alterations only could be expected as might serve to augment the power of the rulers, with little or no attention to the rights of the people. Here we find the principal cause of the degeneracy of those governments. In more modern times, from a fortunate concurrence of circumstances, among which, may be reckoned a more free and extended intercourse between nations, even the benumbning influence of a despotic government has not been sufficient to prevent an advance, and in many instances, a rapid advance in knowledge, through the greatest portion of the civilized world. And the effect has been, and it is to be hoped always will be a correspondent amelioration of the government, as in England,—or the total subversion of it as in France; although the horrors which attended that catastrophe are deeply to be lamented. The political institutions of the United States in which we include the constitution of the general government are, in many respects, essentially different from all preceding institutions. Their great leading principles are-first, that the sole end of all government ought to be, to promote and secure the happiness of the people. And second, that the people are the only legitimate source of political power, that the ultimate sovereignty resides in the people subject to such regulations only as they themselves shall have prescribed. These two leading principles embrace all the laws of social nature, which have any relation to the subject of government, and furnish the means of making amendments to the constitution corresponding with the progress of the citizens in social improvements and political science; they furnish also the means of establishing fundamental laws binding on every department of the government, legislative, executive, and judicial, as well as the means of giving full effect to those laws by subjecting to the test of the constitution all the act of those departments from which is to be apprehended any danger to the legitimate rights and liberty of the people and holding all the great functionaries of the government accountable for the constitutional discharge of their several trust to the established tribunals, and through the medium of periodical elections, constantly accountable to the tribunal of public sentiment the people-as we have before seen. The idea of incorporating in the constitution of the government a plan of reformation, which without encouraging a spirit of innovation, the parent of anarchy and final despotism might enable the people, with deliberation, and more mature experience to correct what should be, at any time, found wrong in the form, principles, or operation of the government, was first, adopted in practice by the states of the union, in forming their several constitutions. It has been found not only practicable in the exercise, but its happy effect in ameliorating their institutions had in several instances been fully evinced. The idea was taken up and pursued in framing the constitution for the government of the United States,-and to carry it into full effect, an article was introduced, which requires no comment for its explanation, or to manifest the wisdom and propriety of its provisions and their accordance with the best principles of the government. I shall therefore, content myself with a simple repetition of the article. "Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to the constitution, or on application of two thirds of the sever |