The legal conditions of admission and membership in public secondary schools of the United States indicate that lawmakers and courts are fundamentally interested in making available to all the people the best educational advantages that the public secondary schools afford. The courts support uniformly legislators and public secondary school boards in all reasonable use of their legislative powers providing legal regulations for the purpose of insuring these advantages to the people. The legislatures and the courts are harmoniously cooperating to eliminate racial and social jealousies from the public schools. The laws relating to admission and membership in public secondary schools seek to provide uniform, free and universal opportunities for enjoyment of the privileges and resultant benefits of the public secondary curricula of the United States.

CHAPTER VI

PROVISIONS FOR VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE UPON PUBLIC SECONDARY

SCHOOLS

In the preceding chapter some of the principal legal regulations relative to admission and membership in public secondary schools were considered. In this chapter the law relating to the educational rights of children, as shown by the voluntary and compulsory attendance statutes as interpreted by the courts, will be presented. It is significant that, not only are many of the states offering broad curricular advantages free to all the people, but also the legislatures are providing by statutes guarantees that the children, at least, and sometimes the illiterate adults, shall share in the educational opportunities provided.

These statutory guarantees as related to voluntary and compulsory attendance assume three forms: laws providing for the discovery of individuals who are of compulsory school age, laws providing for the enforcement of the statutes requiring public school attendance, and laws permitting exemption from public school attendance under certain conditions.

As a means for discovering the identity and place of residence of individuals who should be in public schools, the statutes of almost all states provide for a school census. Forty-seven states require by law that a census of individuals of school age be taken.1

The early attitude of the courts was that the statutes requiring a census of children of school age to be made by the trustees of the school districts granted exclusive powers to the trustees. Their reports were not subject to rejection by school officials of the county even though believed to be incorrect. 2 State aid, once apportioned to a school district on the basis of a fraudulent census

See key number 1315, Summary Chart X, post Young, County Sup., v State ex rel. Morgan et al (1894) 138 Ind. 206, 37 N. Ε. 984, 985

return, could not be recalled and rightfully reapportioned according to the statutes at that time. These holdings, which seem questionable from the standpoint of justice, have not been followed in a recent case in Utah. In this case the Supreme Court of Utah held that the Salt Lake City Board of Education, having received $49,912.06 more than it was justly entitled to as a result of an erroneous census, must have that amount withheld from the next apportionment by the state superintendent of schools.

The statutory requirement delimits the duty of the trustees in furnishing census data. Thus where the law requires a census to be taken every five years, a census may not be required more frequently by the state superintendent of public instruction. A public school enumeration should include "children residing in the district at the time" rather than "permanent home" or "domicile"."

All states prescribe the ages of compulsory public school attendance. The ages included within the compulsory full-time day attendance laws vary from the minimum requirement of from eight to twelve years of age in Virginia to the maximum requirement of from six years to eighteen years of age in Idaho and Ohio.7 Twenty-four states prescribe the ages of compulsory part-time continuation school attendance. Ten states require part-time attendance up to sixteen years of age. Michigan sets seventeen years as the upper limit. Twelve states compel part-time attendance until eighteen years of age. Rhode Island requires illiterates to attend part-time school until twenty-one years of age unless they attend evening

8

The Inhabitants of the Township of Morris, in the County of Morris, v A. Carey,
Silas H. Arnold and Lewis H. Johnson (1859) 27 N. J. 377, 389

Bd. of Ed. of Alpine School Dist., Utah County, et al v Bd. of Ed. of Salt Lake
City et al (1923) 62 Utah 302, 219 P. 542, 547
Louisville School Bd. v Supt. of Public Instruction (1897) 102 Ky. 394, 43 S. W.
718, 719

State ex rel. Logan et al v Shouse et al School Directors (1924) (Kansas City,
Missouri Court of Appeals) 257 S. W. 827, 828

"See key number 1322, Summary Chart X, post See key number 1060, Summary Chart IV, ante 'See key number 1060, Summary Chart IV, ante

school. California, in addition to requiring part-time attendance up to eighteen years, has a statutory requirement that those between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who cannot read and write the English language to a degree of proficiency equal to that of the sixth grade of the elementary schools must attend special part-time classes at least four hours per week unless they attend evening classes for a similar time.

Attendance upon evening classes is compulsory for adolescents and adults in ten states. 10 Three states require those who have not attained a fifth grade standard of literacy to attend evening classes until twenty-one years old. Massachusetts requires illiterate males to attend evening classes until twenty-one years of age. California and Rhode Island require illiterates to attend either evening or day part-time classes. Colorado and Connecticut require illiterate working youths between fourteen and sixteen years of age who are not attending day schools to attend evening schools. Nebraska statutes require youths of fourteen to sixteen years of age who are not eighth grade graduates to attend evening classes unless attending day schools. Utah according to the statutes of that state, requires illiterates to attend evening classes until thirty-five years of age.

The authority of the state to require attendance upon public secondary schools, unless exempted for one of the statutory causes, is enforced by courts. Every state makes the parents or guardians responsible for the school attendance of the children, and provides fines upon parents or guardians if the children are not required to comply with the attendance laws. 11 Ignorance of the details of the compulsory attendance law does not excuse a parent or guardian from the fine for its violation. 12 Neither may a citizen who violates the compulsory attendance law pick his own magistrate; but he must be tried before "any justice of the peace or juvenile judge."13 However, where a child was excluded from school for failure to comply with a rule of the public school as to vaccination and the evidence showed that the parent was willing and anxious to have the child attend, the conviction was held to be unlawful.14

The statutory prescriptions of ages included within the compulsory attendance provisions have been interpreted in their usual meaning and so as to guarantee to children the maximum of educational opportunity. Thus, where the statutes of Tennesee specified the ages as between the "ages of seven and sixteen years, inclusive," the state Supreme Court held that a child sixteen years and six months old must be sent to school. Justice Bachman, in rendering the opinion of the court said:

"The words are to be taken in their usual and ordinary ac-
ceptation, and, so considered, must apply to children in
their seventh, sixteenth, and intermediate years, as these
respective ages are customarily referred to Hence,
the use of the word in the statute clearly denotes the
intent to comprehend the full period of a child's sixteenth
year."15

If a child reaches the maximum age limit of compulsory attendance laws during the fiscal year but before school sessions begin, he is exempt from the compulsory features of such laws. 16 However, parents must secure the permission of the superintendent of schools, if they would hope to maintain an exemption claim on the basis of the substitution of the private instruction by parents for the standard instruction provided by the public schools. 17

The courts seem to have supported consistently the right of states to require attendance upon public schools unless the youth is attending a private school