501 Opinion of the Court. of the public funds and the times for payment. When this duty has been complied with the amount specified becomes the compensation which is protected against diminution during his continuance in office. On September 1, 1919, the applicable statute declared: "The Chief Justice [of the Court of Claims] shall be entitled to receive an annual salary of $8,000, and each of the other judges an annual salary of $7,500, payable monthly." The compensation fixed by law when defendant in error assumed his official duties was $7,500 per annum, and to exact a tax in respect of this would diminish it within the plain rule of Evans v. Gore. The taxing Act became a law prior to the statute prescribing salaries for judges of the Court of Claims, but if the dates were reversed it would be impossible to construe the former as an amendment which reduced salaries by the amount of the tax imposed. No judge is required to pay a definite percentage of his salary, but all are commanded to return, as a part of "gross income," " the compensation received as such" from the United States. From the " gross income" various deductions and credits are allowed, as for interest paid, contributions or gifts made, personal exemptions varying with family relations, etc., and upon the net result assessment is made. The plain purpose was to require all judges to return their compensation as an item of "gross income," and to tax this as other salaries. This is forbidden by the Constitution. The power of Congress definitely to fix the compensation to be received at stated intervals by judges thereafter appointed is clear. It is equally clear, we think, that there is no power to tax a judge of a court of the United States on account of the salary prescribed for him by law. The judgment of the court below is MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS dissents. Affirmed. PIERCE, GOVERNOR OF OREGON, ET AL. v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS. PIERCE, GOVERNOR OF OREGON, ET AL. v. HILL MILITARY ACADEMY. APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON. Nos. 583, 584. Argued March 16, 17, 1925.-Decided June 1, 1925. 1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. P. 535. 2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § 5259) which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent, guardian or other person having control of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district where he resides, for the period during which the school is held for the current year, is an unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children, and in that respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 534. 3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations can not claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in general, no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage; 4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of their business and property through the improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this statute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and immediate and entitles them to protection by injunction. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P. 535. 5. The Act, being intended to have general application, can not be construed in its application to such corporations as an exercise of power to amend their charters. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. P. 535. 6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the statute is to be effective, and will 510 Argument for Appellant Van Winkle. become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature. P. 536. 296 Fed. 928, affirmed. APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary injunctions réstraining the Governor, and other officials, of the State of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce an amendment to the school law, an initiative measure adopted by the people November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926-requiring parents and others having control of young children to send them to the primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon corporations, owning and conducting schools. Mr. Willis S. Moore, Assistant Attorney General of Oregon, with whom Mr. I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellant Van Winkle. The Fourteenth Amendment does not remove or restrict the power of the State to enact laws necessary to promote the health, safety, peace, morals, education or general welfare of its people. Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U. S. 278; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 666; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 449; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 182; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Interstate Consol. Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co., 249 U. S. 152; N. O. Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light, etc., Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 22; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405. The provisions of a corporation charter and of any law pursuant to which a corporation may have entered into Argument for Appellant Van Winkle. 268 U.S. Boston Beer Co. v. Mas- valid contracts, are subject to modification and annulment under the police power. sachusetts, supra; Stone v. Mayor, etc. v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Eagle Insurance Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 449; Chicago B. & Q. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 59; Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. Police Court, 251 U. S. 22; Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U. S. 361; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574. As to minors, the State stands in the position of parens patriae and may exercise unlimited supervision and control over their contracts, occupation and conduct, and the liberty and right of those who assume to deal with them. State v. Shorey, 48 Ore. 396; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519; State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259; Gibbons v. Gibbons, 75 Ore. 500; Merges v. Merges, 94 Ore. 246; State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324; Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412; Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co. 147 N. C. 566; People v. Ewer, 141 N. Y. 129; Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 209; State v. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552; Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372; State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 321; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; In re Turner, 49 Kan. 115; Vanwalters v. Board of Children's Guardians, 132 Ind. 567; State v. Rose, 125 La. 462; Ex parte Powell, 6 Okla. Cr. Pr. 495; Egoff v. Board of Children's Guardians, 170 Ind. 238; United States v. Behrendsohn, 197 Fed. 953; Interstate Company v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79. The statute does not interfere with religious liberty. Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589; Brunswick Co. v. Evans, 228 Fed. 991; People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 335; Swafford v. Keaton, 23 Ga. App. 238; State v. Mockus, 113 Atl. 39 (Me.); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 132; Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 110; People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476; Commonwealth 510 Argument for Society of Sisters. v. Has, 122 Mass. 40; Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412; Wilkes-Barre v. Garabed, 11 Pa. Super. 355; Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270. The American people as a whole have unalterably determined that there shall be an absolute and unequivocal separation of church and state, and that the public schools shall be maintained and conducted free from influences in favor of any religious organization, sect, creed or belief. Art. I, Const. U. S.; Art. I, § 5, Oregon Const.; Art. VIII, § 3, Id.; Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691; Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762; Evans v. Selma Union High School District (Cal., 1924), 222 Pac. 801; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379. The provisions of subdivision "d" of the act conferring upon county superintendents power to determine that a child is not being properly taught and to order him sent to a public school, do not invalidate the measure, but relate to a proper exercise of administrative power. The fact that the amendment to § 5259, Oregon Laws, contains new provisions in conflict with a succeeding section of the act, which was not amended, does not invalidate the amendment. Mr. William D. Guthrie, with whom Mr. Bernard Hershkopf was on the brief, for appellee in No. 583. This bill establishes a case of irreparable injury imminent to the appellee's business and property. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, 558; Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 82; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 100. Courts of the United States have jurisdiction because a federal constitutional right of the plaintiff-appellee was |