individuals composing it: and thus we are led to the same conclusion, that every form of confederacy is a constitution and government; that the laws are equally obligatory upon the citizens, and that the distinction between them consists in the more or less perfect machinery which is employed to enforce them. In all there is a division of the sovereignty, one portion being retained by the states separately, and the residue alienated, not to the central government, but to the states jointly. The distinction, then, so far as it affects the right of secession, is not between the more or less perfect form of federal government, but between a federal and consolidated government. This is the only test in our power, in order to determine when the right of secession exists.

Very imperfect notions were entertained, even under the former confederacy, of the structure and attributes of the state governments. In the debates of the convention, (Yates notes, p. 184,) Mr. Madison says, "the states at present are only great corporations, having the power of making by-laws." "The states never possesed the essential attributes of sovereignty. These were always vested in congress." He then compares the states to the counties of which they are composed, and argues, that as the counties are not sovereign, the states cannot be. If so fine a mind could err so greatly with regard to the appropriate authority of the states, it will not appear surprising that very inadequate notions are entertained at the present day. From one extreme, political writers have plunged into another.

A great principle can never depend for proof of its validity upon examples, since these may contradict some other principle of equally high authority. But where the example has been deduced from the principle, and could not have existed without it, it is of wonderful use in testing its value. It is then a direct corollary from the principle, and not merely a happy illustration of it. The confederation of 1778 was broken up by secession. The articles on which it was founded provided that no alteration should ever be made, unless with the unanimous consent of the states who were parties to it. The states were not unanimous in the change which substituted another ordinance, and converted the government into the present confederation. Rhode Island and North Carolina rejected the scheme, and may have remained out of the Union to the present day. Eleven states thus seceded from the old confederation. If it should be said that these states did not secede because the new government erected in place of the old, was itself a federal union; the answer is, that any change of the articles, much more the radical change which led to the formation of a new government, was absolutely prohibited unless the consent of each state was obtained. Indeed the futility of the objection will be manifest on a very little reflection. If two or more states were now to assemble in convention, or if all the states were so to assemble, and by a majority of votes should form a different federal government, it would be absurd to say they had not seceded, because the form of polity which they had established had one or more features in common with the former. But if, in order to test the bearing of the objection, we should admit it to be well-founded, the difficulty still exists. The states of North Carolina and Rhode Island then seceded. Their right to remain out of the new union, was never disputed; it was openly and unequivocally admitted. The congress under the new government never dreamed of coercing them into an adherence to it, but dealt with them as independent nations; and as I have before observed, they may have continued to this day separate and independent states.

There is another difficulty which presses upon us, and which creates more than a doubt whether the states composing a confederation are mere corporations, or municipal bodies, like the provinces and departments of a consolidated government. The states of Rhode Island, New York and Virginia, in ratifying the constitution, expressly reserved the right to secede. The first declared "that the powers of government may be reassumed by the people, whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness." The second made a declaration in precisely the same language. Rhode Island entered the union a considerable time after New York, and copied the language which had been used by the New York convention. The ratification of Virginia declared that "the powers granted under the constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." No language can be more precise and unequivocal. Each of these states declare that, although on entering into the confederacy a division of the sovereignty was made between the states jointly and the states separately, this partition was not inconsistent with a withdrawal from the Union, and that the right to secede was reserved to the states respectively. No tribunal is erected or contemplated, in order to determine the course of action of the states, when the crisis arrives. The question whether the trusts conferred upon the federal government have been perverted, or in the unqualified language of New York and Rhode Island, whether "the happiness of their people would be promoted" by a resumption of the powers granted, is not submitted to any tribunal under the federal government. The supreme court of the United States is never alluded to. Its interference is, by necessary implication, precluded. No such disposition could possibly be made of the matter. A judicial tribunal is unable to determine a question of expediency: it is only adopted to adjudicate cases where the naked question of right is presented. The constitution has skillfully guarded the peace of the confederacy, while the states remain in it, by referring the constitutionality of the laws to the supreme court. But what causes shall be of sufficient magnitude to induce a state to withdraw altogether from the operation of the constitution and laws, and by thus withdrawing, to avoid all conflict between state and federal jurisdiction, is, from the necessity of the case, submitted to the state itself. This is the undisguised avowal of the three states I have referred to; it is equally so of the whole Union, which accepted these declarations as conformable with the fundamental principles of a confederate government, and thereby ratified them. As one member of a federal union cannot possess any higher federal right than is enjoyed by all, the inference is direct, that even if the right of secession were not an inherent attribute of confederate states, it is at least reserved to every American state. The time has gone by when we can conceal the truth, from a persuasion that the knowledge of it may be abused. The discovery will assuredly be made, and if made in the midst of a settled and determined opposition to its promulgation, all the institutions of society, and not one merely, will be in jeopardy. The European doctrine is, that in matters of government, it is necessary that statesmen should have both a secret and a declared opinion. The maxim in America should be, that the justest use will, in the long run, be most likely to be made of every right, where it is clearly, frankly and unreservedly admitted.

The value and importance of the principle I have been endeavoring to unfold, will be appreciated, when it is recollected that in every community whose population comes to be spread over a wider and wider arena, a diversity of views, habits and customs will necessarily grow up, over which the laws can very imperfectly preside. Even Charlemagne, who wielded the power of one of the most consolidated governments which ever existed, was compelled to declare that "it was impossible for the central authority to watch over every interest with all the care which was desirable, or to retain every one in the path he should follow."

All writers on public law, agree that in the event of intolerable oppression, the people are justified in making resistance to the government. The terms in which this proposition is conceived are very remarkable. 1st. The cases which will authorize so violent a departure from the settled order of things, are not enumerated and defined. The principle is expressed in language the most general and ambiguous. 2d. The idea of a tribunal to sit in judgment upon the controversies which may lead to revolution, is not entertained, but is directly repudiated. 3d. The maxim is proclaimed in governments which are supposed to possess an absolute and selfexisting authority. The principle is attended with dangers of the greatest magnitude, and yet we can discover no way of escaping from it. The great desideratum then, is to be able to contrive some expedient which will exempt us from this stern necessity, which will substitute peaceable in the place of violent revolution. The aggregate form of government does not admit of this remedy; the confederate does. Instead of forcible resistance to the federal head, instead of unlawful attempts to annul the laws of the Union, while the member is within it, that member is at liberty quietly to depart, while others retain their position in the confederacy. This is one of the most important attributes of a federal government. Secesion is the instrument happily substituted in the place of open hostility to the laws. So that in the confederate form of government, the law itself provides against those great emergencies which in other countries are said to make the laws for themselves.

The great risk which will be incurred by the seceding member, the disadvantageous position in which it will be placed, standing alone in the midst of a firm and compact league, will operate as a powerful check upon its conduct, and will prevent recourse to such an extreme measure, unless it can be justified before the bar of public opinion. At the same time, the open recognition of the right to secede, will render it disgraceful to embark in any scheme of concerted resistance to the laws while the state continues a member of the Union. The explicit recognition of the right will also operate as a salutary restraint upon the central government. If one or two states seceded, they would inevitably be the losers: it would be staking every thing upon the cast of a dye. But if several threatened to do the same, the confederacy would be in danger of being deprived of so much strength and importance, that every measure which prudence and calm judgment could suggest, would be adopted to avert so great a calamity. The public councils would be marked by more reflection, when a moral agency was substituted in the place of brute force. Rhode Island and North Carolina were resolute in their opposition to the present constitution, and for a time refused to enter into the Union. Congress pursued towards them the same course which it did towards the European states: it treated them as independent nations, and applied to them the laws relative to discriminating duties. This contributed greatly to change their resolution. They entered the confederacy, one of them two years after it was formed; and motives till more powerful, will deter either from now seceding. The right of secession, then, is a weapen of defence of great efficacy in the hands of the states, but it supposes one still more efficacious in the hands of the federal government. The advantages of union are so manifold, the position of a member, when isolated is so insignificant, and when united with others, so commanding, that nothing but the greatest injustice, or the most irreconcilable diversity of interests will occasion the exercise of the right. Instances of secession are accordingly very rare. Two of the states composing the Boetian confederacy seceded, and the dismemberment of the provinces of Holland and Belgium may perhaps be regarded as similiar. They were united in one confederacy in 1814, and were disunited in 1830, by the withdrawal of Holland. The rupture was occasioned in part by an irreconcilable difference in the religious creeds of the two peoples, and in part by the improper interference of the central government with the education of the people.

The principle of representation is one of the finest expedients which has been devised, for perfecting the machinery of government. In a country of great extent, it is ineffectual, unless it is combined with another principle of equal importance. This consists in dividing the territory, if it has not previously been divided into separate jurisdictions, and investing each with complete control over its domestic interests. If this is not done, the general and local interests will be confounded. The last can be but imperfectly represented or understood, and yet will be subjected to the same undistinguish