In the Roman commonwealth the plan of arranging men into classes, according to their various professions and trades, was at one time industriously pursued. The comitia of the centuries, the then legislative body, was organized in this manner. But to marshal the various orders of men into distinct classes, and yet to make sure that one or two of these classes should decide the vote, was the very way to prevent a reconciliation of the interests of all. This assembly was, accordingly, superseded by another legislative body, the comitia of the tribes, in which the members voted " per capita." This is the true way of preventing classes from being arrayed against each other, and of giving unity and vigor to the public will. Nothing is more common in America than to find individuals of the same class or occupation enrolled in different parties. Our opinions, when they are free to express themselves, do not depend upon the callings we pursue, but are modified by numberless other But the moment we draw men up in classes, and make this arrangement a fixed political institution in the state, we diminish the chance of uniting the interests of all. The "esprit du corps" starts up, and disposes the members of different classes to look upon each other with a hostile eye. The Roman and the French commonwealths were never so prosperous as after all circumlocution in the mode of voting was abolished.

causes.

The constitution of France, in its general outlines, is modeled after the British. The chief points of difference are that in France (by the law of 1831, now incorporated into the "charte," as provided for by its sixty-eighth section), peers can only be created for life, and no endowment of property can be bestowed upon them. There is also, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, no ecclesiastical establishment. Religion may be said to be established by law, but no one sect has a preference. The clergy of all denominations are equally provided for by the government. The life tenure of the peerage, however, throws that body into a greater dependence upon the king than is compatible with constitutional monarchy. The only remedy short of the abolition of the order, is to cause those members who sit in the house of lords to be elected by the general body of nobility, instead of being placed there by the king. There is much more reason for adopting this plan in France than in Scotland and Ireland. The French nobility are exceedingly numerous, amounting to several thousands, while the nobility of Scotland and Ireland are a very small body each. Moreover, the institution would more quietly and gradually give way to a different and better organization of the upper house. The tenure for life is one step toward this end. But without the intermediate preparation I have indicated, the transition from a privileged body to a senatorial assembly would be more abrupt and violent than would be desirable.

It has been supposed, that the minute division of the soil in France, was unfavorable to the formation of a middle class. That such a class does exist however, is certain, from the fact that there are two hundred thousand persons, the least wealthy of whom can afford to pay a tax of three hundred francs. These two hundred thousand persons, with their families, will give nearly a million of individuals. There are not many countries in Europe, where so large a proportion of the population is placed in more independent circumstances. Something more, besides primogeniture and entails, is requisite to prevent the creation of small properties. In Italy, where the eldest son succeeds to the estate, the division of the soil is carried further than in France, yet it is surprising how large a number of proprietors in the former, can afford to lease their land even upon the metayer system of cultivation, and at the same time live comfortably upon their proportion of the produce. The number of idle persons is larger in Italy than in France. The younger sons are disinherited, feel little or no incentive to exertion, and live as they can, upon the pittance doled out to them by the eldest brother. Land in Italy, and a great part of France, can bear to be divided into smaller estates, than in northern and central Europe, because the productions of the soil are monopoly ones, and therefore give monopoly prices. Certain it is, however, that the abolition of primogeniture and entails in France, by placing men more on an equality, has driven them to greater self-exertion. Large properties give rise to a larger surplus, but for the same reason, they create a host of laborers, both in the town and country. If there is no class in France so rich as the country gentlemen of England, there is none so poor as the manufacturing population of the latter country. The views with regard to both countries, have been doubtless exaggerated. The subdivision of the soil in France is not so general as is represented, nor are large properties in England so universal as is sometimes supposed. A large

proportion of the land which belonged to the French "noblesse," before the revolution, has got back into their hands, and very extensive farms are common, throughout the northern part of the kingdom. The majority of the French population live in the country, the majority of the English inhabit the towns. The employments of the people, and the means of subsistence which they derive from these employments may, after all, be as much divided in the one country as in the other. The location only of the poorer class in each may be different. In France, this class will be found principally in the country; in England, it is congregated in

the towns.

Up to the time of the revolution, it was the king and nobility who were set over against each other, for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium of the government. Now, it is the "tiers état" and the king. The middle class have figured greatly in all the revolutions which have occurred since the reign of blood. It was that class which was chiefly instrumental in closing the period of anarchy. It was the same class which ruled during the memorable three days of 1830, and succeeded in establishing constitutional monarchy. The "charte" of Louis XVIII, was an act of mere grace; that of the present king was fairly extorted by public opinion. Indeed, when one considers that all the revolutions in Europe, in Germany, and Italy, as well as in France, have been accomplished chiefly by that class, it is evident that very important changes have taken place in the structure of society; that there is, in other words, a very general tendency toward depositing some part of the active power of society in an entirely new quarter. When this state of things has lasted long enough to exert a positive influence upon the manners, and to persuade all public men that in order to govern securely, as well as wisely, it is not enough to defer in some small degree to public opinion, but that it is necessary to enlist its active co-operation in the administration of the government, the difficulties which have hitherto obstructed the progress of enlightened institutions, will be in a fair way of being overFor admitting, that it should never be possible to carry out the plan of the American government in its full extent, so as to make the public will, in its genuine signification, the moving spring of government, yet unspeakable advantage will be procured to all orders of men, by communicating to the middle class a political weight, corresponding with the rank which it has attained in society. The unbalanced governments stand in need of some such support, of some mediatorial power, which, standing between the two extremes, the highest and the lowest classes, shall control the excesses of the last, and make it the interest of the first to be just to all parts of society.

CHAPTER VI.

IS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT A BALANCED ONE?

IF by a balanced constitution we intend one in which the principal checks to power reside within the government, the American government is not a balanced one. The materials are happily wanting, with which to construct a political system of that character. There is no order of nobility, no hereditary prince, no ecclesiastical establishment. These are necessary elements in the composition of what is ordinarily understood by a balanced government. There is no commonalty as distinct from the rest of the population. The people are not divided into active and passive citizens: the electoral franchise is enjoyed by all, and the government is thoroughly elective in all its branches. The political institutions, though destined to perform different functions, have one character, and conspire to one common end. As they are not the accidental growth of circumstances, but have been formed with design, the power which created them continues afterward to uphold them, and to regulate their movements. So that the American government, although not a balanced one in the European acceptation of the term, is so in a still higher sense. None of the departments possess a self-existing authority, none exercise an independent will of their own: for they are all controlled by a great outward force which resides in the community.

Political checks are of two kinds; those which exist in the society, but are exterior to the government, and those which are inserted in the government, and which for the most part, compose that organized body which we denominate the political system. The first is of two kinds: it may consist either in that omnipresent control