within the treaty-making power, and that therefore the legislative power must be appealed to. The unions, therefore, were decreed by separate acts of the English and Scotch, and the English and Irish parliaments, and the proceeding was by bill, as in all others acts of legislation.

There is a very interesting problem, which the power of altering constitutions presents in America. When the deputies of the people have assembled for this purpose, and have not been bound by any specific instructions, is society resolved into its original elements? can the mass of society be treated as mere "tabula rosa"? so that the whole body of laws and institutions can be, not only prospectively, but retroactively, annulled. If, for instance, numerous private associations have grown up under the protection of the former laws, can they be swept away without regard to the deep and permanent injury which would be done to great multitudes of private persons? This power has been contended for, in one state convention; but it was instantly rejected, although the population of that state was, at the time, perhaps the most democratic in the union ;-a remarkable proof to what an extent the American people are impressed with the notion, that might does not give right, and how deeply all orders and parties, are convinced, that the great rules of morality and justice are not a gift by men, but a gift to men. It is admitted, that the authority of all public officers may be instantly abrogated by a constitutional convention; and the argument, that the analogy should be pursued through every species of private association, which the laws had created, would appear to have some color. Nevertheless, the distinction has been rigidly adhered to, and the contrary doctrine been proclaimed as both immoral, and anti-republican. If this were not the case, there would be nothing to prevent a convention from annulling all marriages; and so introducing a host of mischiefs, which no time could cure. I do not pretend to say, that instances may not occur, of associations which are semi-political and semicivil in their character, and which may be abolished by an "ex post facto" constitutional ordinance. But there must be a great and overruling necessity to authorize it to be done. The mischief intended to be remedied must be so glaring as to shock the common sense of mankind.

What I have been most intent upon showing is, that the Amer

ican people have been scrupulously jealous of their own power; that they have endeavored to guard against the idea that might gives right; and have thus given to the term " sovereignty of the people" an interpretation which it has received in no other commonwealth, either of ancient or modern times.

CHAPTER IV.

POLITICAL TOLERATION-IS IT PRACTICABLE?

RELIGIOUS toleration has produced tranquility in the Christian world; and if toleration could also be introduced into the affairs of government, it could not fail to exercise a similar influence. But it does not very readily appear how this can be done. It is not necessary that religious sects should act ; at least it is not necessary that they should act beyond the sphere of their own societies. All that is necessary, in order to render religious toleration complete, is to permit all denominations to enjoy freedom of thought, and to make such regulations within themselves as are conformable to their own creed and discipline. But the case is very different in the world of politics. It is made up of political parties, and of one or other of these parties is the governing power of the community composed. In other words, the government must be wielded by the majority; and this majority is not only obliged to act, but to act beyond itself; to make rules for others, as well as for itself; to preside, in short, over the interests of the whole community. There is then a wide distinction between religious and political parties, which seems to place insuperable difficulties in the way of introducing political toleration.

If it is possible, however, to contract the sphere within which parties, even the party in the majority, are permitted to act; if, without questioning the authority of this last to go beyond itself, and to make rules for others, the occasions on which it exercised this right were diminished both in number and importance, it is not impossible that we might succeed in introducing into political affairs, a spirit of toleration, which would exercise upon governments an in

fluence very similar to that which religious toleration has exercised upon religious sects.

For that it is not at all necessary for a religious party so to act as to impress its authority upon others, is a maxim of very recent date, and is an effect of the very general progress which the human mind has made during the last hundred years. Religion at one time was regarded as one of the chief, if not the chief, political concerns of the state. Religious parties did constantly act, and act so effectually, as to affect the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. The system of intolerance seemed calculated to perpetuate itself; and so long as it lasted, the most enlightened understandings were borne down by the innumerable obstacles, which stood in the way of religious toleration.

It was easy to frame a plausible argument in defence of this state of things. It might be said that, from time immemorial, religious and political questions had been so mixed, that to attempt to separate them would be to do violence to both religious and political interests; would, at any rate, undermine the authority of government; if for no other reason, simply because the minds of men had constantly run in that channel; that when there was a multitude of sects in the state, their religious tenets would exercise a powerful influence upon their political opinions; that this would lay the foundation for intestine dissensions, which would rend the whole community; that the only cure was to give unity to religion, to establish it by law, and to exclude all dissenters from the privileges which were enjoyed by the favored sect; that in this way the unity of the government would be preserved, and its authority rendered inviolable. The inference then would be a necessary one, that government could no more avoid acting in religious matters, than it could avoid the duty of defending the state against foreign invasion. Arguments, in some respects similar, might now be employed to show the impropriety of political toleration.

The pope, at a very early day, became one of the most considerable potentates of Europe. Religious dogmas, of one kind or other, exercised complete dominion over the minds of men; and other princes, in order to maintain tranquility among their own subjects, and to preserve an equilibrium of power abroad, believed that it was necessary to add to their political, a very large share of ecclesiastical authority also. Through all the ramifications of society, in public as well as in private life, religious and political opinions were so interwoven that it seemed impossible to separate them. A war might be waged by the head of the church for the avowed purpose of imposing the most absurd and impious rites upon other nations, and if, as might naturally be expected, numerous adherents of these rites still lingered among those nations, their governments might persuade themselves that it was necessary to suppress freedom of religious opinion at home, in order to deal a successful blow upon the enemy abroad. This was the first occasion of religion becoming an engine of government in the modern European states, and of the universal introduction of religious intolerance. And as religion was thus erected into an affair of state, a further consequence took place, that ecclesiastics very generally became the statesmen of Europe.

The destruction of the papal power-the gradual decline of all the Italian commonwealths, which for centuries composed the most civilized part of the European continent the employment of men in civil life, in all public affairs and above all, the general progress of knowledge, industry, and freedom, have contributed to reverse the old order of things. A separation has actually been effected, between the political interests of the state and the religious doctrines which are taught.

The tendency of modern society, then, is to withdraw religion from the arena of politics, to put all sects in the possession of privileges which were formerly usurped by one, so that it shall no longer be necessary, nor even possible, for government to extend its legislation over some, in order to promote the agrandizement of others. The freedom of thought which has grown up everywhere, at the same time that it has disarmed the civil magistrate of a most dangerous authority, has created such a multitude of sects, that it would sometimes be impossible to bestow power upon one, without oppressing a very large majority of the population. It is not in consequence of any speculative notions, as to the justice and humanity of the principle of toleration, that it has gained ground so rapidly: the change has been brought about by a total alteration in the structure of society. The popular will, which reflects religious as well as political opinions, has gradually insinuated itself into the councils of all governments; until it has itself become a power of formidable import. It has attained this influence, either directly by virtue of the principle of representation, or indirectly through